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PRIVATE LAW
used in constructing and maintaining their lines. In Texas East-
ern Transmission v. Terzia,6 the Court of Appeal for the Second
Circuit held that the expropriating company failed to establish
the necessity of a servitude fifty feet in width, and permitted
it to expropriate only thirty feet.7 The court said that "the
rights of ingress and egress, which are inherent in the use of
the servitude granted, would authorize plaintiff to enter upon
and use additional necessary areas subject to the co-existing
rights of defendant to claim damages occasioned thereby" if
the need arose to use machinery of such size that it could not be
accommodated in the narrower servitude.
INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
The total volume of insurance litigation, as usual, was great.
The cases presented a number of interesting questions. The com-
ments that follow cover the most significant.
The Supreme Court held that an injured automobile passen-
ger having received payment under the medical expense provi-
sions of a liability policy on the vehicle was not entitled again
to recover the same expenses in a tort action against the in-
surer.' To require an insurer to pay the same medical expenses
twice under one policy without a definite manifestation of such
an intention would seem clearly inadmissible, which, in sub-
stance, was the position taken by the court. It was observed
that the ruling does not apply to a case where the injured person
is paid medical expenses under a separate contract between him
and his own insurer.
In similar vein the First Circuit Court of Appeal, overruling
a prior decision found to be in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court, held that recovery by a wife for personal in-
juries and a husband for medical expenses could not exceed the
stated limit of a liability policy.2
6. 138 So. 2d 874 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
7. Cf. Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191, 85 So. 2d 260 (1955).
8. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Terzia, 138 So. 2d 874, 877 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1962).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Gunter v. Lord, 242 La. 943, 140 So.2d 11 (1962).
2; Guarisco v. Swindle, 132 So.2d'643 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
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The Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit found in favor
of the beneficiary of a group policy of life insurance although
at the time the policy was issued the applicant was in critical
condition because of cancer, as he and the agent knew. No physi-
cal examination was required. The application, which called
merely for information concerning applicant's employment, was
filled out by the agent falsely. It was not, however, attached
to the policy, and, in consequence, the court refused to consider
it. The holding seems clearly sound. An important advantage
of group insurance is the fact that in most cases no medical
examination is required; the company voluntarily assumes the
risk of the applicant's physical condition. Presumably, premium
payments are adjusted on the basis of experience with groups
of insureds and may, therefore, be counted as reflecting the
probabilities with respect to the number of applicants who may
be uninsurable.3 It would not seem in order, therefore, to find
an applicant for such a policy guilty of vitiating fraud because
of his non-disclosure of facts which he is led to believe he does
not have to disclose. 4
The same court distinguished two earlier cases on the basis
of the language of the policy being considered, and found it
unnecessary for the insured to show some reasonable possibility
of theft to support a claim of mysterious disappearance." Based
on the jurisprudence, a "working" conclusion might be that
where the policy treats a mysterious disappearance as a theft,
the facts must reflect a reasonable possibility of theft, but where
a mysterious disappearance is given independent coverage no
such showing is necessary.
The troublesome distinction between hostile and friendly
fires was presented in a case considered by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal." It concerned a provision of a standard fire
policy covering "direct loss by fire" which excluded loss result-
ing from explosion. A welder's torch ignited hydrogen gas, and
the court's finding was that the loss was caused by the resulting
explosion rather than fire. It was observed that the fire which
caused the explosion was a friendly fire. An earlier case Jwhich
3. See MoBRAY & BLANCHARD, INSURANCE 302 (5th ed. 1961).
4. Covington v. Prudential Insurance Co., 136 So.2d 731 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1962).
5. Englehart v. Assurance Co., 139 So.2d 108 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
6. Levert-St. John, Inc. v. Birmingham Fire & Casualty Co., 137 So.2d 494
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
7. Salmon v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 161 So. 340 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935).
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rejected the distinction followed generally between losses result-
ing from friendly and hostile fires, was found unpersuasive on
the ground that the issue before the court in the present case
was not whether a loss by fire was caused by a hostile or a
friendly fire but whether the loss was caused by fire or explo-
sion. The distinction appears to be an appropriate one inasmuch
as losses which result from explosions in the course of a hostile
fire have not been considered within the exclusion."
In a very carefully considered opinion the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal also held that a death resulting from asphyxia-
tion brought about by aspiration of the contents of the stomach
was not within a policy provision covering death by external,
violent, and accidental means.9 The case of Schonberg v. New
York Life Ins. Co.,10 which established the view that a death
by accidental means is nothing more than an accidental death,
was distinguished on the ground that the blood transfusion
which there resulted in death was an external means whereas
the aspiration which occurred in the case before the court was
internal. Presumably, if aspiration and asphyxiation occur while
food is going down instead of while the contents of the stomach
are coming up, the result would be different." In both cases,
however, death appears to come accidentally and one may won-
der whether, in view of Schonberg, such a death should not be
counted as within the purview of the policy provision judged by
the standard of the average man.12 There was medical testi-
mony that the vomiting was brought about by sore throat and
tonsillitis, and the narrow basis of the decision is indicated by
the court's taking note of the fact that the evidence did not
establish that death resulted from the aspiration of food and
suggesting that a different result might be reached where the
vomiting is brought about by trauma or the consumption of
noxious substances. This seems to suggest that, if such a death
may be counted as caused by an outside agency as opposed to
an infirmity of the body, it should be within the policy provi-
sion. If so, considering the fact that the death was brought
8. But see Note, 36 TUL. L. REV. 865 (1962).
9. Towner v. Prudential Insurance Co., 137 So.2d 449 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962).
10. 235 La. 461, 104 So.2d 171 (1958).
11. See the court's discussion of American Acc. Co. v. Reigart, 94 Ky. 547,
23 S.W. 191 (1894) in 137 So.2d 449, 453 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1962).
12. It should be noted, however, that (1) certiorari was denied, and (2)
Judge Tate, who, as Justice of the Supreme Court ad hoe, wrote the opinion in
the Schonberg case, was a member of the panel that rendered the instant decision.
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about by vomitus entering the lungs, where it would not nor-
mally be found, might not the means be counted as an agency
coming from outside the lungs and therefore external? And if
a distinction is to be based on the quantity of food particles
(i.e., an outside agency) which may be contained in the vomitus,
how nice must the weighing be?
The Third Circuit also adopted the view held generally that
a creditor beneficiary of a life policy which does not exclude
death by suicide is entitled to recover thereon notwithstanding
the suicide of the cestui que vie shortly after the issuance of
the policy.13 The beneficiary was held to have acquired a vested
right under the policy when issued. The court left open the
question whether suicide may ever defeat recovery in the ab-
sence of proof of fraud or a specific policy provision. Most
cases decided elsewhere appear to deny recovery in such event
if the beneficiary is the insured's estate.14
In keeping with the general weight of authority, the Court
of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit held that a plea of guilty to
a charge of negligent homicide is admissible but not conclusive
in an action brought to recover on a life policy.15 The same
court held also a loss resulting from a breach of contract will
not support a direct action against the wrongdoer's insurer.-
The language of the direct action provision was relied on as
primary support for the latter decision.
The position of permittees under the omnibus clause and the
opinion of the Second Circuit Court of Appeal in the interesting
case of Hurdle v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.' 7
have been considered in a comment in an earlier issue of this
Review.'8
13. Gulfco Finance Co. v. Guillory's Estate, 134 So.2d 121 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1961).
14. 29A Am. Jun. Insurance §§ 13-14 (1940).
15. Smith v. Southern National Life Ins. Co., 134 So.2d 337 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1961).
16. Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 140
So.2d 212 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
17. 135 So.2d 63 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
18. Comment, 22 LA. L. REV. 626 (1962).
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